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Target Corporations, Hostile Horizontal Takeovers
and Antitrust Injury Under Section 16 of the
Clayton Act After Cargill
BRENT W. HuBER*
INTRODUCTION
Targets of a hostile corporate takeover often seek a preliminary injunction
under section 16 of the Clayton Act' to enjoin the acquisition by alleging
that it would violate section 7 of the Act.2 In Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of
Colorado, Inc.,3 the United States Supreme Court held that private plaintiffs
must demonstrate a threat of "antitrust injury" to obtain standing under
section 16 of the Clayton Act. 4
The federal circuits have split over the application of the Cargill Court's
antitrust injury requirement in target standing cases. The Second Circuit
recently held that a target corporation's loss of independent decision-making
constituted antitrust injury.5 Courts in other federal circuits have held that
targets did not demonstrate antitrust injury because the acquired target
corporation would ultimately benefit from any anticompetitive effects of
* J.D. Candidate, 1991, Indiana University School of Law at Bloomington; B.S., 1987,
Purdue Umversity.
1. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 16, 38 Stat. 730, 737 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §
26 (1988)). Section 16 of the Clayton Act provides in pertinent part:
Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and
have injunctive relief, in any court of the United States having jurisdiction over
the parties, against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws
when and under the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief against
threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is granted by courts of
equity.
Id.
2. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1988)). Section 7 provides in pertinent part:
No person shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the
stock and no person shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets
of another person where the effect of such acquisition may be substan-
tially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
Id. Although section 7 originally applied to corporations only, it includes unincorporated
entities as well. See H. HovnticAm, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTrrRuST LAW § 11.1, at 293
(1985).
3. 479 U.S. 104 (1986).
4. Id. at 113.
5. Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 258 (2d Cir.) (panel
decision split), cert. dismssed, 110 S. Ct. 29 (1989).
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the acquisition. 6 This split among the federal circuits promises to generate
much controversy in the takeover field and has resulted in inconsistent
adjudications of targets' antitrust claims. 7
This Note contends that a target corporation should be allowed to establish
antitrust injury in rare instances when the target can demonstrate an
anticompetitive harm both to itself and to competition. Part I briefly outlines
the pertinent jurisprudential history of antitrust law and the implications of
the federal courts' emphasis on econormic efficiency. Part II traces the
origins of the antitrust injury requirement and its relationship to the doctrine
of antitrust standing. Part III focuses on the antitrust injury requirement
of section 16, analyzes the reasomng in three recent decisions that have
considered target standing under section 16 and examines the rationale for
denying standing to targets.
This Note rejects both the per se rule against target standing and any
rule that effectively grants all targets standing under section 16. This Note
argues that no black-letter rule of standing can ensure that targets' section
16 claims for injunctive relief will be properly adjudicated. Target corpo-
rations can demonstrate a threat of antitrust injury only when a fact-
sensitive analysis reveals that the target has alleged an anticompetitive harm
to both itself and competition in the relevant market. A finding that a
target corporation has established antitrust injury should not always be
dispositive of the standing question because, in some cases, other standing
factors may be relevant.
I. SECTION 7 ANTITRUST JURISPRUDENCE
James K. Baker, the chairman of Arvin Industries, hurriedly scheduled a
lunch date with his long-time friend, Robert Garton. Chairman Baker was
worried. A few days earlier Arvin Industries had received a letter from the
infamous Belzberg family threatemng a hostile takeover.8 Baker knew he
6. Panels in the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have held that a target had not demonstrated
"antitrust injury." Burnup & Sims, Inc. v. Posner, 688 F Supp. 1532, 1534 (S.D. Fla. 1988);
Burlington Indus. v. Edelman, 666 F Supp. 799, 805 (M.D.N.C. 1987). Only panels in the
Second, Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have considered whether a target corporation has standing
under section 16 after Cargill.
7 Burnup & Sims and Burlington held that targets in the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits,
respectively, did not have standing under section 16. Burnup & Sims, 688 F Supp. at 1534;
Burlington, 666 F Supp. at 805. After Consolidated Gold Fields, targets in the Second Circuit
may have standing. See Consolidated Gold Fields, 871 F.2d at 258. The post-merger combi-
nations in Consolidated Gold Fields and Burlington would have controlled approximately one-
third of their respective markets. Compare Consolidated Gold Fields, 871 F.2d at 255 with
Burlington, 666 F Supp. at 804 (listing the market shares of the corporations in the respective
cases).
8. Miller, How Indiana Shielded A Firm and Changed the Takeover Business, Wall St.
J., July 1, 1987, at 1, col. 6.
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had to act quickly. He hoped to convince his long-time friend in the Indiana
Senate, Robert Garton, to introduce the sort of anti-takeover legislation
necessary to save Arvin Industries and its home, Columbus, Indiana, from
wrenching change. 9
Before news of this takeover bid spread, Columbus and Arvin Industries
had enjoyed a "long, cozy relationship."' 10 With its "tree-lined streets and
gingerbread storefronts,"'" Columbus is comfortably nestled in the hills of
southern Indiana.12 Arvin employs approximately 2,000 of the 30,000 resi-
dents of Columbus. Hundreds of Columbus children attend a pair of schools
that Arvin donated to the town in the 1950s. In the summers, these children
play in a 70-acre wooded youth camp, another Arvm donation.13
When Columbus needed a new superintendent of schools a few years ago,
Arvin executives helped in the nationwide search. Later, the company
donated money to lure the top prospect to southern Indiana. When Shirley
Lyster, an English teacher at Columbus North High School, called Chairman
Baker for help in finding Homer in an out-of-print George Herbert Palmer
translation, Arvin printed a special edition for her. 14
When the Belzbergs loomed over Columbus, however, the town's residents
feared that a takeover would shatter their cozy relationship with Arvin. 5
The Belzbergs, a powerful Canadian family, were notorious takeover artists.
Their rise began in 1919 when Abraham Belzberg migrated to Canada from
Poland and built a successful used furniture business. Abraham's three
sons, Samuel, William and Hyman, later moved the family into the real
estate, banking and energy business. By the nd-1970s, the family's flagship
company, First City Financial Corporation, oversaw an empire worth billions
of dollars. In the early 1980s, the Belzbergs earned a reputation for showing
up on the doorsteps of large American compames, brandishing minority
shareholdings in the compames and threatening a hostile takeover.' 6 The
Belzberg's advances threw the town of Columbus and Arvin's management
into a turmoil. Residents feared that Arvin's personality would change
overnight if the Belzbergs bought the company. Brooke Tuttle, an official
at the Columbus Chamber of Commerce, explained, "[tihere's a kind of
attitude you get from an out-of-town owner-the focus is on the bottom
line .... 1"7 Reports circulated that Abraham Belzberg's grandson, Marc,
was calling Arvin as often as three times a day, vowing to launch a hostile
9. See id. at 12, col. 4.
i0. See id. at 12, col. 2.
I1. Id. at 1, col. 6.
12. See id. at 12, col. 2.
13. See id. at 12, col. 1.
14. Id. at 12, col. 2.
15. See id.
16. Id. at 1, col. 6.
17. Id. at 12, cols. 2-3.
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tender offer for Arvin. This takeover bid was a threat that Chairman Baker
felt only a new law could remedy Thus, Baker turned to his long-time
friend and Indiana Senator, Robert Garton, for help. Because Garton was
the President of the Indiana Senate, Baker thought Garton could help enact
the sort of anti-takeover measure that could save Arvin and Columbus from
a bitter defeat. 8
A few months later, the Indiana legislature passed a major anti-takeover
statute that was officially labeled "emergency legislation."'' 9 "Armed with
this leverage, Arvin"managed to repel the Belzbergs' takeover bid, and the
two settled."
20
Such accounts abound in corporate takeover lore. The fear, passion and
sheer desperation that are fueled by takeover artists such as the Belzbergs
often find their way into the legislation governing corporate takeovers. As
a result, the antitrust laws and other legal havens of takeover targets bear
the marks of the emotional debate surrounding hostile corporate takeovers.
Section 7 of the Clayton Act was enacted in 1914 and prohibits acquisi-
tions or mergers the effect of which "may be substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly ,,21 After a spate of major
corporate acquisitions, Congress amended section 72 in 1950 to arrest the
"rising tide of economic concentration ' 23 and limit the perceived abuses of
corporate power. Senator Estes Kefauver, co-sponsor of the amendment,
summarized congressional concerns when he protested that the "trend of
great corporations to increase their economic power is the antithesis of
meritorious competitive development. Local economic independence
cannot be preserved in the face of consolidations such as we have had
during the past few years." ' 24 In United States v E.L du Pont de Nemours
18. See id. at 12, col. 4.
19. Id. at 12, cols. 4-5. The current version of this anti-takeover statute is codified at IND.
CODE § 23-1-42 (1988).
20. Wall St. J., July 1, 1987, at 12, cols. 4-5. Under the terms of the settlement, Arvin
acquired a tire-valve company owned by the Belzbergs and all of the Belzbergs' stock in Arvin.
Id. at 12, col. 5.
21. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988). The Clayton Act was the second major antitrust law. The first
major federal antitrust law was the Sherman Act, ch. 647, §§ 1-6, 8, 26 Stat. 209-10 (1890)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988)).
22. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), amended by Celler-Kefauver Antimerger
Act, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125, 1126 (1950) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988)).
23. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315 (1962) ("The dominant theme
pervading congressional consideration of the 1950 amendments was a fear of what was
considered to be a rising tide of economic concentration in the American economy.").
24. 96 CONG. REc. 16,452 (1950). One commentator concluded that this amendment was
predicated on five fundamental assertions: (1) the concentration of industry had reached very
high levels in America, (2) this concentration was increasing, (3) mergers traditionally played
an important role in the process of concentration, (4) the country was experiencing a new
wave of mergers in which big firms were swallowing little businesses and (5) section 7, as
originally enacted, was defective because it allowed for acquisition through the purchase of
[Vol. 66:625
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& Co.,21 the Supreme Court characterized this amendment to section 7 as
a prophylactic measure, intended to arrest the perceived evils of intercor-
porate relationships in their "incipiency."26 The principal evil at which this
amendment was directed was the erosion of competition accomplished by
the "cumulative centripetal effect of acquisitions by large corporations,
none of which by itself might be sufficient to constitute a violation of the
Sherman Act.'"27
In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States2 the Supreme Court held that a
shoe manufacturer's acquisition of a large shoe retailer violated section 7
of the Clayton Act. The Court, rmrroring Senator Kefauver's concerns
about the protection of small businesses, reasoned:
Of course, some of the results of large integrated or chain operations
are beneficial to consumers. Their expansion is not rendered unlawful
by the mere fact that small independent stores may be adversely affected.
It is competition, not competitors, which the Act protects. But we
cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote competition through
the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses. Congress
appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might result from
the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets. It resolved these
competing considerations in favor of decentralization.2
The Court's reasomng in Brown Shoe is significant. Although the Court
recognized that the protection of small businesses may result in inefficiencies
and impose higher costs on consumers, the Court believed Congress had
determined that the protection of small, locally owned businesses was more
important.
Since Brown Shoe, the Supreme Court's concern for small businesses has
faded. In the 1970s, notions of economic efficiency and consumer welfare
gained prominence in the Court's antitrust jurisprudence. Antitrust scholars
have noted that the term "power" domnnated the antitrust opimons of the
Warren Court in the 1960s whereas the terms "efficiency" and "market
assets. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law.and Economics, 74 HAgv.
L. REv. 226, 234-35 (1960). In addition, Bok noted:
mhe curious aspect of the debates is the paucity of remarks having to do with
the effects of concentration on prices, innovation, distribution, and efficiency.
To be sure, there were allusions to the need for preserving competition. But
competition appeared to possess a strong socio-political connotation which cen-
tered on the virtues of the small entrepreneur to an extent seldom duplicated in
economic literature.
Id. at 236-37.
25. 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
26. Id. at 597.
27. United States v. Von's Grocery, 384 U.S. 270, 283 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Congress sought to reach. the "process of concentration" that was thought to be outside the
scope of the Sherman Act. See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 317 & n.32.
28. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
29. Id. at 344.
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impact" dominated the Burger Court's antitrust opimons during the 1970s. 30
Although little consensus exists among scholars concermng the reasons for
this shift in policy, some commentators assert that the accelerating inflation,
lower productivity, growing balance -of payments deficit and increasing
global competition that characterized the national economy in the 1970s
prompted this policy shift.31 Many scholars and national policymakers now
argue that antitrust policy should accent the efficiencies to be gained from
mergers 2 on the theory that, inter alia, size and power may be necessary
to compete with foreign firms. a3
Throughout this evolution in its antitrust jurisprudence, the Supreme
Court has consistently maintained that the antitrust laws protect "compe-
tition."3 4 However, in the Court's recent antitrust opimons, which strongly
emphasize economic efficiency and consumer welfare, 3 the jurisprudential
conception of "competition" differs significantly from the "competition"
envisioned by the Brown Shoe Court. Rather than protecting the viability
of small, locally owned businesses, the Court's pro-competitive antitrust
30. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REv 1140,
1152 (1981); Note, Antitrust Standing of Target Corporations to Enjoin Hostile Takeovers
Under Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 55 Fo.DwHAm L. REv 1039, 1040 n.6 (1987).
31. See Fox, supra note 30, at 1143.
32. The Department of Justice Merger Guidelines now reflect these views. See U.S. Dep't
of Justice Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,824-37 (June 29, 1984). These guidelines state
in part: "Although they sometimes harm competition, mergers generally play an important
role in a free enterpnse economy. They can penalize ineffective management and facilitate the
efficient flow of investment capital and the redeployment of existing productive assets." Id.
at 26,827 "The pnmary benefit of mergers to the economy is their efficiency-enhancing
potential, which can increase the competitiveness of firms and result m lower pnces to
consumers." Id. at 26,834.
33. Joelson, Challenges to United States Foreign Trade and Investment: Antitrust Law
Perspectives, 14 INT'L LAw. 103, 112-13 (1980); see Bickel, The Antitrust Division's Adoption
of a Chicago School Economic Policy Calls for Some Reorganization: But Is the Division's
New Policy Here to Stay?, 20 Hous. L. REv. 1083, 1112 (1983).
34. See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 344 ("It is competition, not competitors, winch the
[Clayton] Act protects. But we cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote competition
through the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses."); Brunswick Co. v. Pueblo
Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (emphasis in onginal) (quoting Brown Shoe, 370
U.S. at 320) ("The antitrust laws, however, were enacted for 'the protection of competition
not competitors."'); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 115 (1986) (emphasis
in onginal) (quoting Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 488) ("The antitrust laws, however, were enacted
for 'the protection of competition not competitors."').
At least one commentator has argued that competition remains as the "fundamental goal
of the antitrust laws." Note, supra note 30, at 1040-41.
35. In the 1980s, the Court's analysis of antitrust issues has increasingly emphasized
economic efficiency. See, e.g., Business Elecs. v. Sharp Elecs., 485 U.S. 717, 723-31 (1988);
FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458-64 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. v.
Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 582 (1986); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,
472 U.S. 585, 602-05 (1985); Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pa~ific Stationery & Pnnting,
472 U.S. 284, 293-98 (1985); NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100-15 (1984); Jefferson
Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9-18 (1984).
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policy now seeks primarily to protect price competition and other essentially
"economic" goals.36
As the Brown Shoe Court recogmzed, however, a pro-competitive policy
can promote non-economic goals as well as economic goals. The economic
goal of a pro-competitive policy is to maximize consumer welfare through
the efficient allocation of scarce resources and the progressive development
of new productive methods and products that put these resources to better
use. At the same time, however, a pro-competitive policy can also promote
non-economic goals that are commonly valued. Competition can disperse
wealth, limit the power and size of businesses, broaden entrepreneurial
opportunities and substitute the impersonal forces of the marketplace for
the exploitation, coercion and prejudices of private individuals or groups.37
Thus, a pro-competitive antitrust policy that essentially excludes these non-
econormc goals could be criticized for having a rather limited jurisprudential
notion of competition in the marketplace.
Some scholars have labeled these non-economic goals "populist" because
they are concerned primarily with concentrations of wealth and power rather
than the efficient allocation of resources." In many instances these populist
goals comport with. economic goals because an efficient market is often a
36. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters,
459 U.S. 519, 538 (1983) ("[Ihe [antitrust laws were] enacted to assure customers the benefits
of price competition "). In Cargill, the Court reiterated that "it is in the interest of
competition to permit dominant firms to engage in vigorous competition, including price
competition." Cargill, 479 U.S. at 116 (quoting Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson
Co., 729 F.2d 1050, 1057 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984)).
37. 1 P A.REEDA & D. TuRiuaR, ANTrrrUST LAW 103, at 7-8 (1978).
38. As Professors Areeda and Turner explain:
The root populist concern for the dispersal of "economic power" and prevention
of bigness are more social and political than economic. The symbols are those
of Jeffersoman democracy in which small, local, responsible, and individually-
owned enterprises are contrasted with large, politically irresponsible, absentee-
owned, and possibly corrupt giants capable of crushing smaller businessmen and
individuals and of subverting democratic government. In the Jeffersoman world,
economic power is held in check; the virtues of sturdy independent entrepre-
neurship are maximized; and political democracy is thought easiest to preserve.
Id. 109b, at 22. Professor Fox, a proponent of populist goals, argues that antitrust law
should be concerned with more than economic efficiency:
The claim that law should be allocatively efficient is denved from a conception
of all goals as either allocative or distributive. If we concentrate first on
increasing the size of the pie-and only secondarily on how it is distributed, the
claim goes, society will be wealthier and therefore all people will stand to gain;
and if society is not satisfied with the resulting distribution of wealth, it can
redistribute wealth in direct ways.
People do care about ends other than increasing their nation's wealth.
People are willing to sacrifice the abstraction of prospective increased aggregate
wealth for more personal benefits. People care about their opportunities, their
relative rewards, interpersonal fairness, and mutual respect.




less concentrated market.3 9 Only when efficiencies dictate that a larger, more
efficient firm displace smaller, less efficient firms will the economic and
populist goals of antitrust law diverge4 ° In these instances, a court must
make a normative choice between the underlying economic and populist
goals of section 7
In Brown Shoe, the Supreme Court made such a normative choice. The
Court recognized that the protection of small businesses could result in
inefficiencies and could impose higher costs on consumers. The Court chose
the populist goal of protecting small, locally owned businesses over the
economic goal of consumer welfare because Congress, according to the
Court, "resolved these competing considerations in favor of decentraliza-
t i o n . , 4 ,
In recent decisions, however, the Supreme Court has all but reversed
itself by focusing primarily on economic efficiency and consumer welfare.4 2
Even so, the Court has never adopted the "Chicago School" argument that
consumer welfare is the only legitimate goal of section 7 41 Were the Court
to adopt this view, the Court would effectively reverse Brown Shoe and
hold that concerns about wealth distribution, political power, entrepreneurial
opportunity and other populist goals are not cognizable under section 7
By emphasizing antitrust's economic goals without excluding populist goals
or reversing Brown Shoe, the Court has created an uneasy tension between
the underlying goals of section 7 This tension between the varied, and
39. Populist values are often served by a policy that promotes economic efficiency because
an efficient market is often a market that is not unduly concentrated. When several firms
share a market, these firms arguably will possess less individual economic or political influence.
See I P AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 37, 1 110, at 23.
40. Economies of scale in production or distribution reduce the number of firms necessary
to supply most efficiently any given demand. The economies of vertical integration may
displace small suppliers or distributors. Also, firms with superior business acumen may drive
other firms out of the market. In each of these instances, a more concentrated market is more
efficient. See id. 1 103, at 8.
41. See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 344; see also supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
42. See cases cited supra note 35. In Matsushita, the Court held that plaintiffs making
antitrust claims that made "no economic sense" could not survive a motion for summary
judgment without coming forward "with more persuasive evidence to support their claim than
would otherwise be necessary." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587
43. See, e.g., R. BoRx, Tim AN=UsT PARADox 51 (1978) ("The only legitimate goal of
American antitrust law is the maximization of consumer welfare "). Professor Easter-
brook, Judge of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, contends:
Goals based on something other than efficiency (or its close proxy consumers'
welfare) really call on judges to redistribute income. Judges have no metric,
and we ought not attribute to Congress a decision to grant judges a political
power that lacks any semblance of "legal" criteria. Interpersonal utility
comparisons join the theory of the second-best on the scrap pile of useless truths,
not only because no one knows who gets how much utility from how much
money but also because judges aren't very good at moving money around.
Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 Micu. L. Rnv 1696, 1703-04 (1986).
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sometimes conflicting, goals of section 7 of the Clayton Act plays an
integral role in the development of antitrust standing doctrine.
II. ANTITUST STANDING
The Clayton Act provides two remedies for the private enforcement of
section 7. Section 4 authorizes the award of treble damages to persons who
suffer injury in their business or property because of a violation of the
antitrust laws." Section 16 authorizes the grant of injunctive relief to any
person threatened with loss or damage by an antitrust violation. 5 The
doctrine of antitrust standing, however, narrows the class of private persons
who are entitled to relief under these provisions.
The doctrine of antitrust standing is distinct from constitutional standing
and more restrictive. A plaintiff's showing of actual or threatened harm
satisfies the constitutional standing requirement of injury in fact for purposes
of the "case or controversy" clause of article III of the Constitution.46 To
obtain antitrust standing, however, a plaintiff must also be a "proper
party" to bring a private antitrust action.47
A. Section 4 Damages and Antitrust Injury
The antitrust injury requireihent originated in the doctrine of antitrust
standing, which the federal courts first developed to limit the broad language
of section 4 of the Clayton Act. 4s Section 4, literally construed, grants a
right to recover treble damages to all persons who suffer injuries caused by
antitrust violations.49 The federal courts have concluded that Congress did
not intend to confer a right to recover treble damages on all persons
44. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1988)). Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides: "Any person who shall be injured in his
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor
and shall recover threefold the damages by lum sustained." Id.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1988).
46. E.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-501 (1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727, 731.-40 (1972).
47. E.g., Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S.
519, 535 n.31 (1983).
48. See Illinois Brick Co. v. illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 760 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted) ("I concede that despite the broad wording of § 4 there is a point beyond
which the wrongdoer should not be held liable. Courts have therefore developed various tests
of antitrust 'standing,' not unlike the concept of proximate cause in tort law, to define that
point."); Berger & Bernstein, An Analytical Framework for Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE L.J.
809, 810-45 (1977) (discussion of the historical development of antitrust standing doctrine).
49. See Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 529-35; Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready,
457 U.S. 465, 472-73 (1982); Berger & Bernstein, supra note 48, at 812.
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tangentially affected by antitrust violations 0 and have imposed prudential
standing requirements to prevent duplicative recovenes, 51 financial ruination
of defendants5 2 and a deluge of litigation.5 3
A prudential standing test that captures these objectives has eluded the
federal courts. The tests articulated by the courts of appeals include the
"direct injury" test,54 the "target area" test,55 the "zone of interests" test 56
and the "balancing test."' 57 The Supreme Court discarded these mechanical
tests in Associated General Contractors of California v California State
Council of Carpenters"s and adopted a more flexible, fact-sensitive approach
to antitrust standing under section 4 of the Clayton Act. The Court drew
an analogy between the federal courts' struggle to articulate a precise
antitrust standing test and the common law courts' struggle to define
proximate cause. In both contexts, the Court noted, "the infinite variety
of claims that may arise make it virtually impossible to announce a black-
letter rule that will dictate the result m every case. '" 59 To resolve this
problem, the Court consolidated several of the rudimentary aims of section
4 in a series of factors that are to be considered in evaluating plaintiffs'
standing. These factors include: the causal relationship between the injury
50. McCready, 457 U.S. at 477; State of Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 263
n.14 (1972) ("The courts have been virtually unanimous in concluding that Congress did
not intend the antitrust laws to provide a remedy in damages for all injuries that rmght
conceivably be traced to an antitrust violation.").
51. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. at 263-64.
52. See, e.g., Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th Cir. 1975).
53. See, e.g., Calderone Enters. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, 454 F.2d 1292, 1295 (2d
Cir. 1971) ("[I]f the floodgates were opened to permit treble damage suits by every creditor,
stockholder, employee, subcontractor, or supplier of goods and services that mght be affected,
the lure of a treble recovery would -result in an over-kill, due to an enlargement of the
private weapon to a caliber far exceeding that contemplated by Congress."), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 930 (1972).
54. This test grants standing to those plaintiffs whose injuries are considered a "direct"
or "proximate" result of the antitrust violation. See Volasco Prods. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing,
308 F.2d 383, 394-95 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963); Productive Inventions
v. Tnco Prods., 224 F.2d 678, 679 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 936 (1956).
55. This test requires that the plaintiff be in the "target area" of the economy endangered
by the antitrust violation. See Pan-Islamic Trade Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 632 F.2d 539, 546-
47 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 927 (1981); Engine Specialties v. Bombardier Ltd.,
605 F.2d 1, 17-19 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 983 (1980); Southwestern Bell, 518
F.2d at 1131.
56. Injuries within the antitrust laws' protected "zone of interests" are cognizable under
this test. See Malamud v. Sinclair Oil, 521 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975) (disapproved by Blue
Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982)). The Supreme Court originally articulated
the "zone of interests" test in Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150, 153 (1970).
57 Other courts balance factors they deem significant in determining whether a particular
plaintiff ought to have standing. See Mid-West Paper Prods. v. Continental Group, 596 F.2d
573, 582-87 (3d Cir. 1979); Bravman v. Bassett Furniture Indus., 552 F.2d 90, 99-100 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977).
58. 459 U.S. 519, 530-35 (1983).
59. Id. at 536 (footnote omitted).
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and the antitrust violation, 6 the directness or indirectness of harm, 6' the
speculative nature of the injury,62 whether the antitrust litigation can be
kept within judicially manageable limits63 and whether the injury is of the
type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent. 64 The Court required that
each standing question under section 4 be analyzed "in light of" these
factors.6
The final standing factor in Associated General Contractors-whether the
injury is of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent-had been
articulated as antitrust injury six years earlier in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo
Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.66 The plaintiffs in Brunswick, operators of bowling cen-
ters, challenged a large bowling equipment manufacturer's acquisition of
four bowling centers that competed with the plaintiffs. At the time of the
proposed acquisitions, these four bowling centers were in default on several
loans and the bowling industry was declining rapidly. 67 Because the acquired
bowling centers would have gone bankrupt but for the acquisitions, the
acquisitions would have increased the number of competitors in the post-
acquisition market. Thus, instead of increasing the concentration in the
bowling market, the acquisitions had the effect of decreasing concentration.68
Plaintiffs alleged that these acquisitions violated section 7 of the Clayton
Act and sought treble damages under section 4.
Plaintiffs' theory of injury was that, but for the acquisitions, their profits
would have increased when the bowling centers went bankrupt. 69 The Court
rejected this theory, insisting that the antitrust laws "were enacted for 'the
protection of competition, not competitors.' 70 The Court required that the
plaintiffs demonstrate antitrust injury to recover treble damages under
section 4:
[Plaintiffs] must prove more than injury causally linked to an illegal
presence in the market. Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is
to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent
and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful. The
injury should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the violation or
of anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation.71
60. Id. at 537.
61. Id. at 540-42.
62. Id. at 542-43.
63. Id. at 543-45.
64. Id. at 538-40.
65. Id. at 536 & n.33.
66. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
67. See id. at 480-81.
68. Because the acquisitions effectively decreased the concentration in the market, the
acquisitions posed no threat to the populist goals of antitrust law. See supra notes 37:40 and
accompanying text.
69. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 481-85.
70. Id. at 488 (emphasis in original) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294, 320 (1962)).
71. Id. at 489 (emphasis in original).
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Because the plaintiffs' threatened lost profits in Brunswick would have
resulted from revitalized or increased competition, rather than from any
harm to competition, the Court concluded that it would be "immical to
the purposes of these laws to award damages." 7 2
B. Section 16 Injunctions and Antitrust Injury
The Supreme Court extended the Brunswick Court's antitrust injury
requirement to section 16 injunctive actions in Cargill, Inc. v Monfort of
Colorado, Inc.73 In Cargill, Monfort, a meat processor, sought to enjoin a
prospective merger between two of its larger rivals, alleging that the merger
would violate section 7 74 This merger would have increased the defendants'
market share to 20.4% in the cattle slaughter and beef production markets. 75
The defendants, Cargill and Excel, moved to dismiss, alleging that the
plaintiff had failed to demonstrate a threat of antitrust injury under Brun-
swick. Cargill and Excel appealed the trial court's denial of this motion to
dismiss, but the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.76 The
Supreme Court reversed, holding as a matter of law that a private plaintiff
seeking injunctive relief under section 16 must demonstrate a threat of
antitrust injury.77
The Cargill Court considered two theories of antitrust injury. First,
Monfort alleged that it would lose profits after the acquisition if Excel
lowered its prices to a level at or near Excel's costs, thereby "squeezing"
Monfort's profit margin. 78 Relying on Brunswick, the Court reiterated that
lost profits resulting from increased competition are not cognizable antitrust
injuries under section 7 The Court read Brunswick to hold that "the
antitrust laws do not require the courts to protect small businesses from
the loss of profits due to continued competition, but only against the'loss
of profits from practices forbidden by the antitrust laws. ' 79 "'[I]t is in the
interest of competition[,]' the Court concluded, "'to permit dominant
firms to engage in vigorous competition, including price competition."'10
Monfort's second theory of injury was that "Excel would attempt to
drive Monfort out of business by engaging in sustained predatory pricing. '"'
72. Id. at 488.
73. 479 U.S. 104 (1986).
74. See id. at 105-07
75. Id. at 106-07 n.2.
76. Monfort of Colo., Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 761 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 479 U.S.
104 (1986).
77 Cargill, 479 U.S. at 113 (citing Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489).
78. Id. at 114.
79. Id. at 116.
80. Id. (quoting Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 729 F.2d 1050, 1057
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984)).
81. Id. at 117
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The Court found that predatory pricing is capable of inflicting antitrust
injury because its purpose of eliminating competition harms both competi-
tors and competition. 2 In so doing, the Court declined the invitation of
the government, appearing as amicus, to adopt a per se rule that would
deny all competitors standing to challenge prospective mergers on a pred-
atory pricing theory 13 However, the Court refused to consider Monfort's
theory because Monfort had neither raised nor proved a claim of predatory
pricing at trial. Because Monfort failed to make the requisite showing of
threatened antitrust injury, the Court declined to consider the merits of
Monfort's section 7 claim. s4
The Court's reasoning in Cargill illustrates the subtle yet significant shift
that has occurred in antitrust decision-making since the 1960s. Instead of
using section 7 to reduce concentration in the post-acquisition market as it
did in Brunswick,5 the Court allowed an acquiror to increase the amount
of concentration in the post-acquisition market on the theory that it is "in
the interest of competition" to permit dominant firms to engage in vigorous
price competition. In so doing, the Court ignored the potential conflict
between the populist and economic goals of section 7.86 By concluding that
section'7 does not require the federal courts to protect small businesses
from the rigors of competition, the Cargill Court all but reversed Brown
Shoe, which held that the protection of small businesses was more important
than economic efficiency and consumer welfare.8 Simply put, the Cargill
Court viewed section 7 primarily as a vehicle for promoting economic goals.
The Court's antitrust injury requirement for section 16 is simply a judicial
tool for effectuating this policy.
The Court's rationale for extending the antitrust injury requirement to
section 16 largely rests on the premise that sections 4 and 16 provide
82. Id. at i17-18. The Court distinguished predatory pricing and price cutting. Price cutting,
unlike -predatory pncing, is aimed at increasing market share. Predatory pricing is aimed at
eliminating competitors, reducing competition and ultimately earning supracompetitive profits.
See id.
S3. See id. at 120-21. The government requested that the Court consider whether competitors
could ever obtain standing on a predatory pricing theory, arguing that "[tihere are important
reasons why the Court should take the further step of ruling that an allegation of threatened
future predatory pricing is never sufficient to give a competitor standing to challenge an
acquisition." Brief for Amicus Cunae the United States and the FTC in Support of Petitioners
at 10, Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986) (No. 85-473). The
government's argument was that (1) predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried or successful,
(2) competitors' motives for bringing such suits are suspect and create a presumption that a
merger is procompetitive, (3) allowing competitor suits to block mergers would delay mergers
and therefore frustrate efficient mergers and (4) post-merger suits for actual predatory pricing
injuries are a sufficient means of enforcing section 7. See id.
84. Cargill, 479 U.S. at 122.
85. See supra text accompanying note 68.
86. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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complementary remedies for a single set of antitrust injuries.8 8 The Court
acknowledged the differences between antitrust standing to seek treble
damages under section 4 and injunctive relief under section 16. It noted
that standing under section 16, unlike section 4, poses no threat of multiple
lawsuits or duplicative recoveries because 'one injunction is as effective as
100, and. 100 injunctions are no more effective than one."'8 9 Moreover,
the Court hinted that some standing factors, although relevant for section
4, may not be relevant for section 16. 90 The Court also reaffirmed its
position, taken in Associated General Contractors, that a showing of anti-
trust injury per se will not always be sufficient to confer standing under
section 4 because antitrust injury is but one of several factors to be
considered in the analysis. 91 The Court did not state, however, whether a
showing of antitrust injury per se will always be sufficient to confer standing
under section 16.
Thus, after Cargill, target standing under section 16 is uncertain. Cargill
establishes, as a matter of law, that a showing of antitrust injury is essential
for section 16 standing. However, whether a target corporation can satisfy
this requirement is uncertain. Even if a target could demonstrate a threat
of antitrust injury, it is uncertain how many of the other standing factors
listed in Associated General Contractors92 may apply to the section 16
standing analysis for targets, or how much weight, if any, the federal courts
should give these factors. To resolve some of this ambiguity, Part III of
this Note exalmnes the narrower question: whether target corporations
should be perrmtted to demonstrate antitrust injury
III. THE TARGET CORPORATION AND ANTITRUST INJURY
For section 16 standing, the Supreme Court's rule in Cargill requires
target corporations to demonstrate threatened antitrust injury-an injury of
the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and an injury that
flows from the unlawful nature of the defendant's acts. 93 Under this rule,
the target plaintiff must allege a section 7 violation and an injury that flows
88. See Cargill, 479 U.S. at 113. The Court reasoned that it would be anomalous to grant
private plaintiffs injunctions against threatened injuries for which they could not be compen-
sated if the injuries actually occurred. Id. at 112.
89. Id. at 111 n.6 (quoting Standard Oil, 405 U.S. at 261).
90. According to the Court, the standing analysis under § 16 will not always be identical
to the standing analysis under § 4. The Court explained that "because standing under § 16
raises no threat of multiple lawsuits or duplicative recoveries, some of the factors other than
antitrust injury that are appropriate to a determination of standing under § 4 are not relevant
under § 16." Id. at Il n.6.
91. Id. at 110 & n.5.
92. For a list of these standing factors, see supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
93. See Cargill, Inc., v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 113 (1986) (citing Bruns%,ick
Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977)).
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from that violation, or the- federal courts should deny the target standing.
This Note argues that a target corporation can establish antitrust injury
when the target can demonstrate an anticompetitive harm to itself and to
competition. This Note examines when a target can demonstrate antitrust
injury, analyzes three recent cases that have considered target standing under
section 16 and considers whether the federal courts should confer standing
on all targets or, in contrast, whether the courts should adopt a per se rule
against target standing under section 16. This Note rejects both of these
polar rules, concluding that no mechanical, black-letter rule will ensure that
targets' claims are properly adjudicated.
In seeking to enjoin a hostile tender offer under section 16, target
corporations typically cite a litany of injuries, including impairment of
employee recruitment, morale and performance, dislocation of management,
loss of trade secrets, disruption and uncertainty in the business affairs of
the corporation9 and irreversible changes in shareholder composition.95 Such
injuries, however, do not constitute cognizable -antitrust injuries because
they do not flow from the defendant's anticompetitive acts. Instead, these
injuries are concomitants of any corporate reorganization, whether caused
by a merger or other change in corporate control. Such "harms" occur
regardless of the anticompetitive effects of the acquisition and therefore do
not per se constitute an antitrust injury to the target. 96 To establish antitrust
injury under Cargill, the target must demonstrate an anticompetitive injury
that threatens both the target and competition in the relevant market.
Most federal courts have traditionally recognized the need to limit target
standing under section 16 and have viewed target suits under section 16
with suspicion. Both before and after Cargill, however, the federal courts
have split on the question of target standing.Y Of the three federal courts
that have considered target standing after Cargill, only one court has found
that the target demonstrated a threat of antitrust injury.98
94. See Note, supra note 30, at 1050-51 & n.78.
95. Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 530 F Supp. 315 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd, 669 F.2d
378 (6th Cir. 1981).
96. See Note, supra note 30, at 1051.
97. Some pre-Cargill courts had held that target corporations lacked standing under the
Clayton Act. See Central Nat'l Bank v. Rainbolt, 720 F.2d 1183 (10th Cir. 1983); A.D.M.
Corp. v. Sigma Instruments, 628 F.2d 753 (Ist Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Reibert v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973); Carter Hawley
Hale Stores v. Limited, Inc., 587 F Supp. 246 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
Other courts either held or assumed that targets had standing. See Marathon Oil v. Mobil
Corp., 669 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982); Grumman Corp. v.
LTV Corp., 665 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1981); Ladlaw Acquisition Corp. v. Mayflower Group, 636
F Supp. 1513 (S.D. Ind. 1986); Gearhart Indus. v. Smith Int'l, 592 F Supp. 203 (N.D. Tex.),
modified on other grounds, 741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1984); Arnett v. Gerber Scientific, 566 F
Supp. 1270 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F Supp. 933 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
98. See infra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
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The first post-Cargill case considering target standing under section 16,
Burlington Industries v Edelman,"9 held that a target did not demonstrate
a threat of antitrust injury.10 In Burlington, a denim manufacturer sought
to enjoin a takeover, claiming that the acquisition would lessen competition
in the denim industry The plaintiff, Burlington, cited as antitrust injuries
the potential loss of employees, possible diversion of customers to other
businesses, loss of trade secrets and loss of financial information. 1 1 Relying
on Cargill, the court dismissed the complaint, holding that Burlington had
not alleged an antitrust injury because even if there were "a lessening of
competition, the plaintiff company [would] not suffer any injury that flows
from the lessening of competition."'' 02 The court reasoned that Burlington
would become, after the acquisition, "a part of the very entity it claims
will have a supracompetitive advantage, i.e., it suffers no antitrust harm." 03
In short, the court reasoned that Burlington would benefit from the very
effect that it claimed rendered the acquisition unlawful. Denying targets
standing under section 16, the court concluded, "makes imminent Isic] sense
when one views the purposes behind the antitrust laws.' ' 14
Although this reasoning seems effectively to adopt a per se rule against
target standing, the court later equivocated. The court warned that "a court
should not interfere with a tender offer unless the target company dispels
the inference of disingenuousness by showing that the alleged antitrust
violation would expose it to readily identifiable harm."'10 The Burlington
court, however, did not provide any examples of "identifiable harm" that
could constitute an antitrust injury.'06
The second post-Cargill case to consider target standing under section 16,
Burnup & Sims, Inc., v Posner,'07 relied heavily on Burlington. In Burnup
& Sims, a tender offeror moved to dismiss a target's section 7 challenge to
a takeover attempt. 08 The Burnup & Sims court dismissed the target's claim
in cursory fashion, concluding that "[t]he suit must be understood in its
true sense, an attempt by the incumbent management to defend their own
positions, not as an attempt to vindicate any public interest."'19 The court
also reasoned that the shareholders of target corporations would be deprived
99. 666 F Supp. 799 (M.D.N.C. 1987).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 805.
102. Id. at 804-05. The acquisition would have resulted in a post-acquisition combination
that controlled 33.2% of a denim market comprised of five manufacturers. Id. at 803-04.
103. Id. at 805 (emphasis in original) (quoting Carter Hawley, 587 F Supp. at 250).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 805-06 (emphasis added).
106. See id.
107. 688 F Supp. 1532 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
108. The Court did not expressly state whether the plaintiff sought an injunction under §
16 of the Clayton Act. See id. at 1534-35.
109. Id.
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of the tender offer premium if the federal courts would permit targets to
"create their own peculiar subjective and possibly suspect 'public interest'
... ,"1O Unlike the Burlington court, the Burnup & Sims court adopted
what is, in effect, a per se rule against target standing under section 16.
In contrast to the Burlington and Burnup & Sims courts, the Second
Circuit found that a target had demonstrated a threat of antitrust injury in
Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A."' In Consolidated, the
most recent case involving target standing after Cargill, a majority of the
court held that the target plaintiff had demonstrated antitrust injury and
granted the target standing to challenge the takeover under section 16.112
The plaintiff target, the second largest gold producer in the western world,
sought to enjoin a takeover attempt by Minorco, the largest gold producer
in the western world. The post-acquisition combination would have con-
trolled 32% of the western world's gold production market."3 The Consol-
idated court, unlike the Burnup & Sims court, rejected the argument for a
"per se rule." Even though the target plaintiff may ultimately have denved
some economic benefit from the takeover, the Consolidated court found
that the target would "have lost one of the vital components of competi-
tion-the power of independent decision-making as to price and output."114
This loss of independent decision-making and the right to compete, the
court concluded, constituted cognizable antitrust injuries. 15
A. The Consolidated Rule
The decisions m Consolidated, Burnup & Sims and Burlington illustrate
the confusion that reigns in target standing cases under section 16. Unlike
the Burnup & Sims court's per se rule against target standing, the Consol- -
idated court's rule effectively enables every target that is threatened with a
loss of control to demonstrate a threat of antitrust injury. The dissent
recognized this, arguing that "the loss of independence which occurs in
every merger is not the type of loss that the 'antitrust laws were intended
to prevent."' 16 The majority countered, reasoning that even if the total
market share of the combimng corporations were only two percent, "the
target would still have standing ... but it would lose on the merits.""' 7 In
110. Id. The Burnup & Sims court also relied heavily on Easterbrook & Fischel, Antitrust
Suits by Targets of Tender Offers, 80 MicH. L. REv. 1155 (1982).
111. 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 110 S. Ct. 29 (1989).
112. Id. at 255.
113. See id. at 254-55.
114. Id. at 258.
115. See id. at 258-60.
116. Id. at 264 (Altiman, J., concurring m part and dissenting in part) (quoting Brunswick,
429 U.S. at 489).
117. Id. at 258 n.5 (emphasis in original).
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this reasoning the majority equated antitrust injury with antitrust standing
by assuming that all targets that demonstrate antitrust injury will necessarily
have section 16 standing. Thus, the Consolidated court's rule, in contrast
to the Burnup & Sims court's per se rule against target standing, effectively
confers section 16 standing on all target corporations.
In adopting this rule, the Consolidated court failed to appreciate how
targets can thwart takeovers without prevailing on the merits. As Judge
Fnendly explained:
Drawing Excalibur from a scabbard where it would doubtless have
remained sheathed in the face of a friendly offer, the target company
typically hopes to obtain a temporary injunction which may frustrate
the acquisition since the offenng company may well decline the expensive
gambit of a trial or, if it persists, the long lapse of time could so change
conditions that the offer will fail even if, after a full trial and appeal,
it should be determined that no antitrust violation has been shown." 8
Many commentators recogmze that targets often seek temporary injunctions
to effectively extend the tender offer beyond the twenty-day period required
by the securities laws. 1 9 Even when the target has little hope of obtaimng
a preliminary injunction, some courts may delay the tender offer by issmng
a temporary restraimng order. 120 Delay in a tender offer affords management
more time to defeat the bid by implementing defensive measures or locating
a "white knight.' 2' These tactics increase the risk and expense of the offer,
which often causes the offeror to abandon the takeover attempt.22 Thus,
118. Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 854 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974).
119. See, e.g., Rosenzweig, Target Litigation, 85 MicH. L. REv 110, 123 (1986). The SEC
imposes a twenty-day delay on tender offers. SEC Rule 14e-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-I (1990).
120. Rosenzweig, supra note 119, at 123 & n.46; see, eg., Scientific Computers, Inc. v.
Edudata Corp., 599 F Supp. 1092 (D. Minn.) (denying a target's motion for a prelimnnary
injunction, following the earlier grant of a temporary restralmng order after finding that prior
disclosure violations had been remedied), aff 'd in part and dismissed in part, 746 F.2d 429
(8th Cir. 1984).
121. A white knmght is a friendly acquiror who rescues the target corporation from the
clutches of a hostile bidder. L. SOLOMON, D. ScHwAtTz & J. BAtrMA, CoaRPoaRioNs 1065
(1988). During Mobil's attempted takeover of Marathon Oil in 1981, it was reported that
Marathon asked Texaco to be a white knight. Reports speculated that Texaco leaked this news
to undercut the credibility of Marathon's antitrust arguments against Mobil, the potential
acquiror, thereby lessening the likelihood that the Marathon litigation would produce an
antitrust precedent injurious to a possible future tender offer by Texaco for a smaller
competitor. See Metz, Texaco Chief Says Firm Was Approached By Bankers, Others on
Marathon's Behalf, Wall St. J., Nov. 19, 1981, at 2, col. 3.
122. Rosenzweig, supra note 119, at 123-24. One empirical study conducted by Kidder,
Peabody & Co. and Michigan Law Professor Michael Rosenzweig indicated that litigation is
the single most effective defense used by targets to preserve their independence. This study
examined a sample of fifty-three defeated hostile tender offers between 1973 and 1985 in which
the target remained independent for at least one year. Target management employed defensive
measures in forty-five of these cases; tirty-nine of which included litigation against the bidder.
Ir twenty-two of these thirty-nine cases, the bidder was defeated. No other defensive measure
was as successful. Id. at 127-29 & nn.71-75.
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even if a target corporation ultimately loses on the merits, the target can
often thwart the takeover.
Allowing targets to thwart takeovers is problematic because corporate
takeovers can serve as a useful mechanism for disciplining inefficient man-
agers. As Professor Manne has argued, the market for capital assets is also
a market for corporate control in which one firm can either replace the
ineffective managers of another firm or increase the productive efficiency
of both firms by merging.' 23 When the managers of a target corporation
delay a hostile tender offer, the target's managers frustrate this market for
corporate control'4 and deprive society of the benefits of these procompe-
titive efficiencies. Although some scholars have complained that Manne and
other market proponents have neglected other means of disciplining ineffi-
cient managers,'71 few, if any, commentators dispute that corporate takeov-
ers play a legitimate and useful role in a market economy.
In short, the Consolidated court failed to account for the beneficial role
of takeovers in the market and the ability of target corporations ,to thwart
takeovers without prevailing on the merits. By effectively granting section
16 standing to all targets, 26 the Consolidated court's rule allows target
corporations to frustrate the market for corporate control and deprive
society of the benefits of productive efficiencies.
If the Consolidated rule has a redeeming factor, it is that the rule
recognizes that the antitrust laws can promote non-economic or populist
goals as well as economic goals. The Consolidated rule holds that a "loss
of independent decision-making" and the "right to compete" are cognizable
antitrust injuries. Neither of these injuries necessarily involve a threat to
the economic goals of promoting efficiency and consumer welfare. 27 Thus,
if an efficiency-enhancing takeover threatens populist goals, a target could
123. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. PoL. EcoN. 110 (1965).
See generally EcoNoMIcs OF CoaRorAON LAw AND SECURITIES REGULATION 195-231 (R.
Posner & K. Scott eds. 1980) (discussing the market for corporate control).
124. J. Sidak, Antitrust Preliminary Injunctions in Hostile Tender Offers, 30 U. KAN. L.
Rnv. 491, 496-97 (1982).
125. One of these critics, Professor Coffee, does not dispute that the market has a disciplimng
effect on inefficient managers. However, he does believe this effect has been exaggerated and
that market proponents have neglected the role corporate fiduciary duties can play in disciplimng
management. Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of
the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 CoLUM. L. Rnv. 1145 (1984).
126. The majority in Consolidated conceded that its rule would confer standing on all
targets. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text. Because the majority concluded that
antitrust injury is the only § 4 factor to be considered in the § 16 standing analysis, a showing
of antitrust injury is sufficient for § 16 standing under the Consolidated rule. See infra note
128 and accompanying text. The majority made no effort to limit its rule to the specific facts
of the case and seemed to analyze the antitrust injury question as if only two solutions existed:
(1) adopt a per se rule against all target standing under § 16, or (2) construct a rule that
effectively granted all targets standing under § 16. See Consolidated, 871 F.2d at 258-60.
127. For a discussion of the economic and populist goals of antitrust, see supra notes 37-
40 and accompanying text.
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conceivably allege a cognizable antitrust injury.12 However, because the
Consolidated court concluded that antitrust injury is the only factor to be
considered in the section 16 standing analysis, 129 every target of a takeover
attempt will have section 16 standing, even though many takeovers pose no
threat to either the economic or populist goals of section 7 The Consolidated
rule, therefore, could force many benign takeovers to run a gauntlet of
antitrust litigation that cannot be justified on either economic or populist
grounds.
By granting standing to all targets who will suffer a "loss of independent
decision-making," the Consolidated rule permits targets to use section 16
to ward off corporate takeovers that pose no threat to the goals of antitrust
law. Congress did not enact section 16 of the Clayton Act to be used as a
routine defensive measure to thwart takeovers that serve a legitimate and
essential role in disciplining inefficient corporate managers in a market
economy. For a target to properly establish antitrust injury after Cargill,
the target must allege an anticompetitive injury that threatens both the
target and competition in the relevant market. This antitrust injury inquiry
is rigorous and properly requires the federal courts to engage in a careful,
fact-sensitive analysis of each case.
B. The "Per Se Rule"
The Burnup & Sims court recognized the practical realities and problems
surrounding targets' section 16 suits for injunctive relief and adopted what
is, in effect, a "per se rule" against target standing. In adopting this per
se rule, the Burnup & Sims court embraced the sort of mechanical, inflexible
approach to standing that the Supreme Court condemned in Associated
General Contractors.'3 ° This rule requires the federal courts to ignore the
128. In the Jeffersoman model, such a takeover would presumably have to involve "polit-
ically irresponsible corrupt giants capable of crushing smaller businessmen and of
subverting democratic government." See I P AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 37, 109b,
at 22. The Supreme Court has not yet articulated any bnght-line tests that clearly delineate
when a particular takeover poses a threat to such populist goals. Even if a target corporation
could demonstrate antitrust injury on a populist theory, other standing factors, such as the
need to keep the litigation within manageable limits, may militate against granting the target
standing. See infra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
129. See Consolidated, 871 F.2d at 259 & n.6. The Consolidated court misread Cargill as
holding that "these other factors relevant to [a] section 4 standing analysis 'are not relevant
under § 16."' Id. at 259 n.6 (quoting Cargill, 479 U.S. at 111 n.6). The precise holding of
Cargill was that "because standing under § 16 raises no threat of multiple lawsuits or duplicative
recoveries, some of the factors other than antitrust injury that are appropriate to a determi-
nation of standing under § 4 are not relevant under § 16." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, Cargill
did not rule out the possibility that other § 4 standing factors may be relevant under § 16.
130. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
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potential anticompetitive effects of an acquisition.' The per se rule also
fails to comport with the Supreme Court's prior holdings that the injunctive
remedy for section 16, "like other equitable remedies, is flexible and capable
of nice 'adjustment and reconciliation between the public interest and private
needs as well as between competing private claims." ' 2 Nonetheless, every
federal court that has examined whether a target corporation can demon-
strate antitrust injury after Cargill has considered the per se rule. 3 '
There are two justifications for the per se rule. First, as Professors
Easterbrook and Fischel argue, target corporations are poor "private attor-
neys general" because they are beneficiaries, not victims, of any subsequent
antitrust violation. 3 4 They contend that takeovers benefit target corporations
because the target, as a part of the post-merger combination, will a fortiori
always benefit from any violation of section 7 15 By definition, therefore,
targets cannot suffer any cognizable antitrust injury from the takeover.
Second, these commentators argue, as did the Burnup & Sims court, that
granting targets standing allows management to pursue its own conception
of the "public interest," which may be detrimental to the target's share-
holders who seek the premium from the tender offer. 13 6
The first justification for this rule-that target corporations are benefi-
ciaries of any subsequent antitrust violation-rests on a faulty assumption.
The proponents of the per se rule argue that an acquired target corporation
can never suffer cognizable anticompetitive harm from a takeover because
the target will merge with the acquiring firm that it alleges will enjoy a
supracompetitive advantage. The assumption underlying this argument is
that, in a successful takeover, targets must merge with the acquiring firm.
Tins assumption is unwarranted. An acquiror can obtain de facto control
in a partial acquisition without merging with the target. 37 Moreover, in
these partial acquisitions, a target corporation can suffer a cognizable
antitrust injury without benefitting from any subsequent antitrust violation.
Bidders generally acquire a target by obtaining over fifty percent of the
target's voting stock and merging with the target. However, a bidder can
131. In Cargill the Court expressly rejected the United States' invitation to adopt a per se
rule denying competitors standing to challenge acquisitions on predatory pncing theories.
Cargill, 479 U.S. at 121. The Court explained, "It would be novel indeed for a court to deny
standing to a party seeking an injunction against threatened injury merely because such injuries
rarely occur." Id.
132. Zenith Radio v. Hazeltine Research, 395 U.S. 100, 131 (1968) (quoting Hecht Co. v.
Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944)).
133. See Consolidated, 871 F.2d at 258-59; Burnup & Sims, 688 F Supp. at 1534-35;
Burlington Indus., 666 F Supp. at 804-05.
134. Easterbrook & Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender Offers, 80 MICH. L. Rnv.
1155, 1155 (1982).
135. See td. at 1156-71.
136. See id. at 1171-78.
137. See Note, supra note 30, at 1053-54.
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often exert significant influence over a target's managerial decisions by
purchasing as little as fifteen or twenty percent of the target's voting stock
without merging with the target.' In these situations, a partial acquisition
has occurred rather than a complete takeover. The target remains an
"independent" competitor in the relevant market, but the target is subject
to the acquiror's de facto control, and the target's assets are not combined
with those of the acquiring firm. Because the target remains a competitor
of the acquiror and the acquiror exerts influence over the target's managerial
decisions, the acquiror may cause the target to reduce output, raise prices,
retard innovation, pull competing products off the market or otherwise
impair the target's competitiveness in a manner that benefits the acquiror
without benefitting the target. 3 9 In the context of a partial acquisition,
therefore, a target could suffer anticompetitive harm from an antitrust
violation without realizing any supracompetitive benefits.
When a target corporation can allege an anticompetitive injury in a partial
acquisition, the target has essentially demonstrated antitrust injury because
the injury will accrue to the target plaintiff and competition. A showing of
antitrust injury, however, is not necessarily sufficient for section 16 standing
because some of the other factors delineated in Associated General Con-
tractors may apply1 40 These factors, such as the need to keep the litigation
within manageable limits and the speculative nature of the injury, may
militate against granting some target corporations standing under section
16. Even so, the need to limit the federal courts' intrusion into corporate
138. Id. at 1053-54. In its analysis of a § 7 violation of the Clayton Act in United States
v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957), the Supreme Court assumed that
du Pont had a substantial influence over General Motors even though du Pont owned only
23% of General Motors' shares. See id. at 588; see also United States v. General Dynaics
Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 489 (1974) (parties stipulated that 34% of target company's shares
amounted to "effective control"); Gulf & Western Indus. v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 476
F.2d 687, 695 (2d Cir. 1973) (19% stock interest sufficient basis for control); Vanadium Corp.
of Am. v. Susquehanna Corp., 203 F Supp. 686, 693-94 (D. Del. 1962) (de facto control can
be obtained with 19.7% of target's stock).
139. See I P AREEDA & D. TuRNER, supra note 37, 1203c, at 318-20. If the acquiring
company is represented on the board of directors of the target, the acquiror may obtain
sensitive information. Either company may lose some of its zeal to compete with the other
when both are represented on the same board. Even if the acquiror is unable to elect a
majority of the board, the acquiror may be able to amass a holding that is large enough to
provide a nucleus for opposing or antagonizing management. See id., F & M Schaefer Corp.
v. C. Schmidt & Sons, 597 F.2d 814, 818 (2d Cir. 1979) (per cunam) (a 29% interest probably
enables an acquiror to appoint directors on a target corporation's board of directors and gain
"access to the confidential trade information of one of its leading competitors"). An acquiror
need not acquire de facto control of a target corporation to violate the antitrust laws. See,
e.g., Denver & Rio Grande W R.R. v. United States, 387 U.S. 485, 501 (1967) ("A company
need not acquire control of another company in order to violate the Clayton Act.").
140. For a list of these factors see supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text. It is uncertain,
after Cargill, how many of these factors may apply to target standing under § 16, or how
much weight the federal courts should give these factors in their analysis. See supra notes 92
& 129 and accompanying text.
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affairs and prevent targets from frustrating takeovers that discipline mef-
ficient managers does not justify denying target corporations standing in
every case. Partial acquisitions can be anticompetitive. By adopting the per
se rule against target standing, the federal courts will effectively prevent
target corporations from enjoining these anticompetitive takeovers.
In addition to the failure to account for anticompetitive partial acquisi-
tions, the per se rule also undermines the private enforcement of section 7
of the Clayton Act. Only the government and private plaintiffs enforce
section 7. In recent years, the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department
and the Federal Trade Commission have undergone significant budget cuts
and have challenged few corporate acquisitions.14 Thus, as the Consolidated
court argued, denying targets standing "would substantially impair [the
private] enforcement of the antitrust laws [because] .... [t]he government,
with its limited resources, cannot be relied upon as the sole initiator of
enforcement actions."' 142
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the "purposes of the antitrust
laws are best served by insuring that the private action will be an ever-
present threat to deter anyone contemplating business behavior in violation
of the antitrust laws."'' 43 Competitors of the target corporation lack the
incentive to enjoin an anticompetitive acquisition in an oligopolistic market
because the acquisition will increase concentration in the post-acquisition
market, thereby enabling the remaining competitors m the post-acquisition
market to engage more easily in collusive, anticompetitive behavior.44
Because consumers seldom suffer sufficient damage to justify the time, cost
and effort of seeking a section 16 injunction, consumer enforcement actions
are rare.' 45 Also, less incentive exists for private plaintiffs to enforce section
7 through a section 16 injunctive action because, unlike under section 4,
-plaintiffs cannot recover treble damages. Targets, however, do have an
141. The Antitrust Division of the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission
(the "FTC") enforce the antitrust laws. The FTC currently has 442 staffers assigned to antitrust
matters, down from 531 in 1980. The number of antitrust lawyers in the Justice Department
has fallen from 429 in 1980 to the current level of 236. These cuts have been widely publicized.
See, e.g., Sontag, Rougher, Tougher New Face, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 9, 1989, at 29, col. 1. Between
1982 and 1987, the Antitrust Division received 11,547 pre-merger notifications. The Division
challenged only thirty-three of these mergers. See Wilkinson, Coming Out of the Closet, Nat'l
L.J., Oct. 16, 1989, at 14, col. 1. See generally, Kovacic, Steady Reliever at Antitrust, Wall
St. J., Oct. 10, 1989, at A18, col. 4 (discussing the implications of budget cuts and new
leadership at the Antitrust Division).
142. Consolidated, 871 F.2d at 260.
143. Perma Life Mufflers v. Int'l Parts, 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968), overruled on other
grounds, Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
144. See H. HovENKcA , supra note 2, § 14.5, at 373 (1985). A reduction in the number
of competitors in an oligopolistic market facilitates collusion because cartelists can more easily
detect cheating and coordinate price and production agreements. See R. PosNRc & F EAsERg-
BROOK, Airninusr 335-40 (2d ed. 1981) (discussing factors conducive to collusion).
145. See Consolidated, 871 F.2d at 260.
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incentive to protect their own interests and, therefore, are viable "private
attorneys general" for section 16.
Nonetheless, Professors Easterbrook and Fischel argue that target cor-
porations lack the "appropriate incentives" to efficiently enforce section 16
and adequately represent their shareholders.'4 As an analytical matter,
whether the target's motivation is to protect the job security of its man-
agement is irrelevant. 47 If the federal courts carefully apply the Cargill
Court's antitrust injury test to the particular facts of each case, the courts
will thwart target management's routine attempts to invoke section 16 as a
means of resisting a takeover or gaimng leverage in the negotiation process.
By requiring plaintiffs to establish antitrust injury, the Supreme Court has,
in effect, greatly restricted targets' use of section 16 as a defensive ploy
Moreover, the shareholders of the target possess no legitimate claim to the
premium of a tender offer that will, if successful, result in an antitrust
violation. Simply put, even though the interests of the target may be more
"private" than "attorney general," the federal courts are sophisticated
enough to apply the antitrust injury test to the particular facts of each case
and ensure that the target plaintiff adequately and efficiently represents the
public interest.148
By rejecting the per se rule against target standing under section 16, the
federal courts will be able to preserve both the economic and non-econonuc,
or populist, goals of section 7. The Supreme Court's reasomng in Cargill
suggests that the Court considers economic efficiency and consumer welfare
the primary goals of section 7.149 By allowing targets to demonstrate antitrust
injury and granting targets standing in acquisitions that threaten efficiency
and consumer welfare, the federal courts can preserve these economic goals
that underlie section 7 Similarly, by allowing targets to demonstrate antitrust
injury and granting targets standing when a particular acquisition threatens
populist goals, the federal courts can guard against inordinate concentrations
of wealth and political power.
In short, the federal courts should allow target corporations to demon-
strate antitrust injury By rejecting the per se rule, the federal courts will
not enshnne any particular economic theory in antitrust law or exclude
other legitimate objectives of section 7 that are commonly valued. Because
target corporations can suffer antitrust injury without realizing any benefits
from an antitrust violation, targets should be permitted to enforce section
16 as "private attorneys general." Until the Supreme Court clearly delineates
the underlying goals of section 7, the federal courts' analysis of targets'
146. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 134, at 1166-78.
147. The Consolidated court found that the question of Gold Fields' motivation for bnnging
the suit was irrelevant to the question of standing. Consolidated, 871 F.2d at 259.
148. See Note, supra note 30, at 1057.
149. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
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section 16 claims will necessarily involve a balancing of the vaned, and
sometimes conflicting, objectives of section 7.
CONCLUSION
The federal courts should not permit target corporations to use section
16 of the Clayton Act as a routine ploy to thwart hostile takeovers that
pose no threat to antitrust concerns. Corporate takeovers play a legitimate
and essential role in disciplining inefficient management in a market econ-
omy. By requiring that private plaintiffs demonstrate a threat of antitrust
injury, the Supreme Court has effectively limited target corporations' routine
use of section 16 as a defensive ploy. Antitrust injury is a rigorous test that
requires the federal courts to engage in a careful, fact-sensitive analysis.
Because of the varied and often competing interests in corporate takeovers,
no black-letter rule of standing will ensure that target corporations' section
16 claims are properly adjudicated. Rather, only a multi-factored, fact-
sensitive approach, winch requires the federal courts to balance the relevant
standing factors delineated in Associated General Contractors, will ensure
that targets' claims are properly adjudicated. Until the Supreme Court
clearly delineates the underlying goals of section 7, the adjudication of
section 16 will necessarily involve a balancing of the vaned, and sometimes
conflicting, objectives of section 7.
1991]

